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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
SPORTS FACILITY LOCATION:
AN END-OF-THE-CENTURY
REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT
TIM CHAPiN:
I.

INTRODUCTION

A great deal of research in recent years has focused upon sports facilities, with particular attention paid to the tremendous amount of public
funding that has been spent on stadia and arenas that are the homes of
professional sports franchises in the "big four" sports leagues.' This research has almost uniformly condemned public spending on these
projects, demonstrating that the economic impact of the teams and facilities is quite small and that any image-related benefits of these facilities
do not translate into economic gains. 2 Even in cities that have aggressively pursued sports as an economic development strategy, evidence
suggests that these cities have not fared as well as other peer cities that
have chosen other development strategies.
On the political front, studies of the political economy of these facilities have investigated the "machine" that gets behind these projects and
asserts political and economic pressure to get stadia and arenas funded
with public funds.4 These studies subscribe to either the growth machine
argument that the economic and social elite in a city drive the local development agenda, often over the wishes of the local citizenry, or that a
"sports regime" mobilizes and pushes for this policy option and then
scatters once the decision has been made. In either model, the central
argument is that sports facilities represent politically attractive policy op* Ph.D., Florida State University, Department of Urban and Regional Planning.
1. The "big four" sports leagues include the National Football League (NFL), Major
League Baseball (MLB), the National Basketball Association (NBA), and the National
Hockey League (NHL).
2. See SPORTS, JOBS, AND TAXES (Roger G. Noll & Andrew Zimbalist eds., 1997); MARK
RosENTRAUB, MAJOR LEAGUE LOSERS (1997).
3. See Mark Rosentraub et al., Sport and Downtown Development Strategy: If You Build
14 Will Jobs Come? 16 J. of Urb. Aff. 221 (1994).
4. See AMY KLOBucHAR, UNCOVERING THE DomE (1982); John Pelisserio et al., Urban

Regimes, Sports Stadiums, and the Politics of Economic Development Agendas in Chicago,
PoL'Y SUD. Rnv. Spring/Summer 1991, at 117, 117; CHARLES C. EUCHNER, PLAYING THm
FIELD (1993); MICHAEL N. DANIELSON, HoME TEAm (1997); JOANNA CAGAN & NEIL
DEMAUSE, FIELD OF SCHEMES (1998).
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tions for public decision-makers and socially and culturally attractive
policy options to city boosters and civic leaders. The attractiveness of
this public policy option, even in the face of more pressing issues such as
troubled education systems and crumbling infrastructure, drives these
groups to mobilize economic and political resources to push for a new
facility.
Perhaps the one major issue that the sports literature has yet to fully
address is the question of facility location. While some authors have begun to investigate the location of sports facilities at the metropolitan
level in their work,5 geographers have studied the landscape of sports,6
and practitioners have identified important criteria in the location of
sports facilities, 7 the question of location has often gone uninvestigated
by political scientists and planners. This gap in the literature is unfortunate as sports facility location provides an excellent indicator of the ebb
and flow of the political economy surrounding these facilities over the
course of the past century. As the public sector has become increasingly
willing to provide monetary and political incentives to professional
sports teams and leagues, the location of sports facilities within the metropolitan area has quite clearly been impacted. Whereas research has
focused upon issues of team relocation and regional shifts in sports
franchises at the national level, very little attention has been paid to the
political economy surrounding the location of facilities within metropolitan areas.8 This leads us into the central questions that will be addressed
in this article. How has the location of sports facilities changed over the
course of the last century? What factors have influenced the siting of
sports facilities within the metropolitan area? Did these factors change
over the course of the century? What explanations can be offered for
these locational shifts and changes in siting factors?
It is widely believed that sports facilities have shown an unsurprising
affinity for following their fan base when locating within a given metro5. See Thomas Chema, When ProfessionalSports Justify the Subsidy, A Reply to Robert A.
Baade, 18 J. OF URB. An'. 19 (1996); Ziona Austrian & Mark Rosentraub, Cleveland's Gateway to the Future, in SPORTS, JOBS, AND TAxEs, supra note 2, at 355.
6. See JOHN ROONEY, A GEOGRAPHY OF AMERICAN SPORT- FROM CABIN CREEK To
ANAHEim (1974); JoHN BALE, SPORTS GEOGRAPHY (1989) [hereinafter SPORTS GEOGRAPHY]; JOHN BALE, SPORT, SPACE, AND THE CrrY (1992) [hereinafter SPORT, SPACE, AND THE
CrrY]; JOHN BALE, LANDsCAPES OF MODERN SPORT (1994) [hereinafter LANDSCAPES OF
MODERN SPORT].

7. See DAVID PETERSEN, SPORTS, CONVESrON, AND ENTERTAINMENT FACILYIES
(1996); GERAirr JoHN & ROD SHEARD, STADIA: A DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT GUIDE
(1997).
8. See EUCHNER, supra note 4; DANIELSON, supra note 4.
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politan area. Over the course of the last century the location of sports
facilities has generally mirrored spatial changes in the location of middle
class families. Early stadia, it is widely believed, were located in dense
urban neighborhoods, with an intentional high degree of accessibility to
their working class and middle class fan base. As cities decentralized, so
did sports facilities. With the coming of suburbanization in the 1950s,
sports facilities also began their migration to outlying locations, thereby
providing vehicular access to their core markets. Mirroring the "rural
renaissance" of the 1970s, that decade saw many facilities constructed in
remote suburban locations, off major interstates, insuring easy access by
car to the facility by the fast suburbanizing middle class. As classic location theory would suggest, sports facility location appears to be linked
directly to the location of their core market over time. Just as retailers
have shifted the location of department stores from central cities to suburban malls to insure adequate access to local purchasing power, so have
sports facilities (and the teams that call them home) migrated to locations that are more likely to be profitable.
Within the past fifteen to twenty years, however, there has been a
massive return of sports facilities to the central city. Projects like the
Metrodome in Minneapolis, the Miami Arena, Pioneer Field in Buffalo,
Camden Yards in Baltimore, Gateway in Cleveland, MCI Center in
Washington D.C., and BankOne Ballpark in Phoenix have all been sited
in central city locations that provide what many have glowingly referred
to as a return to the "good old days" of the early sports facilities. The
majority of recently constructed facilities are located in central cities, adding to the perception of a central city renaissance in North America.
These facilities provide an intensely urban experience, making visitors
interact with cities that they had long since been abandoned (as in Buffalo and Cleveland) or never been known (as in Phoenix).
The location of sports facilities in these dense, complex, urban environments initially seems to fly in the face of location theory and even
good transportation planning. It would appear that sports facilities have
become separated from their core market, middle and upper middle
class households, in other words those fans that can afford to attend
sporting contests that become more expensive each year. In addition,
the accessibility of many of these urban facilities is clearly hampered by
the heavy traffic of downtown areas, the constricted streets of the central
city, and what appears to be limited parking surrounding these facilities.
Even given good mass transit connections, as there are for Baltimore's
Camden Yards, the vast majority of people still travel to games via
automobiles, requiring parking and easy ingress and egress to the facil-
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ity. From a purely theoretical perspective, these locations appear to be
poorly thought out at best and an economic disaster at worst.
A principal purpose of this article is to outline the history of sports
facility location in North America in the twentieth century and discuss
how the factors for siting these facilities have adapted to the changing
political economy of professional team sports. It will be shown that
prior to 1950, sports facilities were almost always located due to facility
costs and market forces, not because of political factors. The location of
the local fan base, the availability of cheap land, and transportation access to the stadium were the factors of paramount importance in the
siting of these early facilities. However, with the increase in public
spending on these sports projects and the linkage of economic development goals to these projects, facility location has become a hotly contested decision at both the national and intra-metropolitan levels. As
will be detailed, this has lead to the inclusion of political factors in the
facility siting process. While traditional fan base, land costs, and transportation are still important factors in determining facility location,
political factors have clearly become a major determinant in the siting of
sports facilities in North American cities.
To preview the central finding of the article, the return of sports facilities to central cities, despite the high land costs and inaccessibility of
many of these in-city sites, has occurred in part because political factors
have pulled these facilities to urban locations. However, the element
that served to guarantee the massive return construction of sports facilities to the central city was the recognition by the sports teams and
leagues that these central city sites were profitable. While economic development initiatives and public funding (political factors) have been
partly responsible for pulling teams back to center city facilities, it was
the changing economics of professional team sports that provided the
essential ingredient in this locational shift.
II.

SPORTS FACILITMES AND URBAN SPACE:

A BRIEF REVIEW

OF THE LITrERATuR

Sports geographers have long been interested in the "landscapes of
modem sport," including the changing location of sports facilities within
metropolitan areas. An early classic of sports geography, Rooney's A
Geography of American Sport, does not delve too deeply into sports fa-

cility location, but instead investigates the incidence of different aspects
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of sports across space. 9 A more recent work by British geographer John
Bale and Swedish geographer Olaf Moen investigated more specifically
the intersection of sports stadia and metropolitan location. In his extensive study of sports and geography, Bale considered the argument that
stadia are "nuisances,"' 0 written on "stadiums as gardens and athletes as
pets,"' 1 and, with Moen, investigated the economic, social, and geographic intersections between sports facilities and urban area in The Stadium and the City, their edited volume from 1994.12
Sports geographers have brought to the literature a better understanding of the changing nature of sports arenas and stadia as spaces for
play. The literature traces the physical and cultural changes from the
unique, place-specific early venues in which fans of all economic levels
sat together, to the modem "cookie-cutter" stadia of the 1960s and
1970s. These later stadia denoted no sense of place and slowly began the
separation of fans by economic class, a practice that continues through
today. These authors have also discussed the metropolitan shift of sports
facilities from dense, urban environments, usually accessible by mass
transit or foot, to suburban, automobile accessible facilities surrounded
by acres of asphalt. The suburbanization of sports stadia has been a part
of the segmentation of cities into distinct, less complex sectors, defined
largely by land uses and activities that take place in these areas. Bale
summarizes this viewpoint (in discussing the work of Moen) when he
writes, "during the twentieth century sporting land use has not only become more suburban but has also become much more segmented with
distinct agglomerations or zones of specialized sporting land use."' 3
Despite their excellent research and wonderful writing style, the
work of both Bale and Moen has somewhat limited application to the
analysis of sports facility location in the North America. In Europe,
sports stadia are still suburbanizing, with (mainly soccer) teams leaving
historic, but cramped inner city stadia for suburban spaces that offer
cheap land and opportunities for larger facilities that can lead to greater
profits in the long run. As will be detailed shortly, North America has
experienced a similar shift in sports facility location at the metropolitan
level, but this era appears to have been superseded by the downtown
facility push of the 1980s and 1990s. In addition, within Europe the relo9. Rooney, supra note 6.
10. See John Bale, In the Shadow of the Stadium: Football Grounds as Urban Nuisances,
75 GEOGRAPHY 325 (1990).
11. See SPORT, SPACE AND THE Crry, supra note 6.
12. See THE STADIUM AND TiE Crry (John Bale & Olaf Moen eds., 1994).
13. SPORT, SPACE AND T=E CrrY, supra note 6, at 95.
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cation of teams and the construction of new sports facilities is usually
instigated and paid for almost entirely by the teams themselves. Localities have not been as avid in their pursuit of professional sports teams,
with much less public funding available for relocation expenses and new
facility construction. In contrast, North America has a long history of
team relocations and inter-jurisdictional bidding wars for sports teams,
with a publicly funded new stadium or arena often at the heart of the
competition. Despite these limitations, the work of these sports geographers has been instrumental in forming the approach to studying the intersection of sport, space, and cities.
As noted earlier, the central research agenda for North American
researchers has usually been upon the economic impacts, financing
boondoggles, and political processes surrounding the provision and construction of major league sports facilities. Most of this research has focused upon the recent facility building boom (approximately 1985present), with only a handful of studies looking at changes over the
course of the century. Even the few studies that have discussed facility
location have tended to focus upon the development impacts of these
facilities. Austrian and Rosentraub investigated the employment impacts
of the Gateway project on Cleveland's downtown, only tangentially discussing the decision to locate the facility downtown.' 4 In his book Major
League Losers, Rosentraub includes a number of excellent case studies
that outline the political history of the projects, sometimes discussing the
locational conflicts surrounding these facilities.15 One of the more interesting discussions of sports facility location and metropolitan development comes from Baade and Dye. 6 In their article the authors outline
the factors that can cement the link between a sports stadium and
microarea development; the regular use of the facility, the linkage of the
project to other nearby activity centers, the capture of spending in the
"microarea," and limiting the spread of surface parking. However, while
their piece provides an excellent set of recommendations for planners
and decision makers involved with a soon-to-be-sited stadium or arena,
it does little to illuminate how and why facility location has changed over
the course of the century or how sites are chosen by local governments
and teams.

14. See Austrian & Rosentraub, supra note 5.
15. See RosErRBtm, supra note 3.
16. See Robert Baade & Richard Dye, Sports Stadiums and Area Development: A Critical
Review, 2 EcoN. DEv. Q. 265 (1988).
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The "How To" books of the sports facility literature provide some
insight into the criteria that are usually considered when locating a facility within the metropolitan area. In Stadia:A Design and Development
Guide, authors John and Sheard note that a sports stadium can be built
in any portion of the city, but that the primary "decision factors" for
siting the facility should be client base, land cost, land availability, and
land use regulations. 7 A similar set of criteria are offered up by Petersen in his book Sports, Convention, and EntertainmentFacilities." Petersen states that the "three most important factors to consider in selecting
a site for a convention, sports, or entertainment facility are those that
affect attendance, income, and occupancy. In other words, location, location, location."'19 The siting criteria specifically identified by Petersen as
important for stadia are considerations of size, visibility and scale, parking availability, and transportation accessibility.2" Clearly, these factors
indicate that the primary criteria for siting sports facilities are based in
site characteristics (size, availability), economic factors (land costs), and
transportation (accessibility). As we shall soon see, these factors were
the principal criteria for siting sports facilities in the first half of the last
century, but in more recent years additional factors have come into play.
III.

SPORTS FACILITY LOCATION IN THE TwENTmTH CENTURY

With the massive financial success, glowing architectural reviews, and
seemingly jump-started districts surrounding Camden Yards in Baltimore, Jacobs Field in Cleveland, and Coors Field in Denver, many have
concluded that baseball has finally returned to its roots. These neotraditional ballparks (ballparks, not stadia) have style and flair, urban roots,
and few empty seats, appealing to fans, players, owners, city officials,
and local merchants. Their success has spurred similar projects in Seattle, Houston, Cincinnati, and Milwaukee, as well as maybe a hundred
others in other major league sports and in the minor leagues. Because of
their success and their settings, many have compared these new
ballparks with many the great old ballparks that were built in the early
stages of the twentieth century; Wrigley Field, Fenway Park, Ebbets
Field, Shibe Park, Yankee Stadium, and the original Comiskey Park
among others.
17.
18.
19.
20.

See JoHN & SHEARD, supra note 7, at 35-36.
See PETRSEN, supra note 7.
Id. at 43.
See id.at 43-46.
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What few have recognized, however, is that most of these early sports
stadia were not constructed in the dense urban environments that most
recall them situated in. Many of the classic ballparks that still stand today were originally sited on cheap land surrounded by little development
or near low density industrial areas (like railyards or stockyards), and
not in the complex, urban, sometimes residential areas as they appear
today. In Chicago, Wrigley Field was built in 1914 on the largely undeveloped North Side of the city, far away from most fans on the South
Side of the city. 21 Comiskey Park, which opened in 1910, was sited on a
former garbage dump, near the "odiferous stockyards."22 Fenway Park
and Yankee Stadium were both located in largely undeveloped portions
of Boston and New York, respectively, because land was cheap and development was recognized as an eventual certainty for that area of the
city. Even the grand old ballpark Ebbets Field, held by some to be the
greatest ever,23 was situated in a low density part of the city, on the
"cheapest land in Brooklyn, which lay between the bustling village of
Flatbush and somewhat suburban Bedford. '24 Only in subsequent years
did the area surrounding Ebbets Field mature, as the addition of numerous transportation connections (trolley lines) provided access to the
ballpark and helped to make the land in the district more available for
development.
An article by Bluthardt provides the most direct discussion of the
location of sports facilities in this era.' This piece focuses on the early
ballparks of the first building boom (1909-1925) and does very well to
outline the main factors that went into site selection during this period.
"When a site was chosen, four factors were considered: accessibility,
neighborhood, room for expansion, and availability. '2 6 These factors allowed the team owners to reap profits because these sites provided
cheap, available land that allowed room for expansion if new decks or
stands were added to the stadia in later years. Accessibility was usually
provided via subway lines or trolley lines that existed within walking distance or were built in subsequent years. In some cases, the ballpark
helped to spur growth in the area (as with Ebbets Field and Shibe Park),
21. See MICHAEL GERsHMAN, DIAMoNDs: THE EVOLUTION
(1993).
22. Id.at 92.
23. See MICHAEL
note 21.

24.

GERsHmAN,

OF

BENSON, BALLPARKs OF NORTH AmERIcA

Tn BALL'ARK 118-120

(1989);

GERsHMAN,

supra

supra note 21, at 110.

25. See Robert Bluthardt, Fenway Park and the Golden Age of the Baseball Park, 1909-

1915, 21 J.

OF POPULAR CULTURE

26. Id. at 43.

43 (1987).
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while in other cases the new stadium had very little affect upon development patterns (as with Fenway Park).' All of these ballparks have been
lauded for their in-city locations, dense environments, and quintessential
"city character," but what most seem to forget is that these stadia grew
to be urban facilities over time. They were not sited in a complex urban
environment, but often at the urban edge where cheap, acceptable land
was available. Certainly, neighborhood-centered ballparks, like Shibe
Park in Philadelphia, were to be found in some cities, but the dominant
factor for siting the earliest sports facilities was cheap and available land.
Transportation and accessibility to the fan base were important, but secondary concerns.
Only a handful of new facilities came online between 1925 and 1950.
However, existing siting criteria continued to assert themselves. As
sports became a profitable business, larger stadia were built to accommodate bigger crowds. Consequently, larger parcels of land were required to house these facilities. Memorial Coliseum in Los Angeles was
sited ten minutes south of downtown, in Exposition Park, near the University of Southern California. Built as part of that city's efforts to (successfully) attract the Olympic Games, the stadium was one of the first to
be municipally financed. The location for the Coliseum was chosen because it provided available land (already leased by the city), offered
good transportation connections for the region (with many nearby trolley lines), and was centrally located in the region.' The massive Cleveland Stadium, which seated over 80,000 on its busiest days, was built on
fill along that city's waterfront. This stadium was located there in part
because of the size of the stadium and the unavailability of affordable
land elsewhere in the city. Like these stadia, other facilities that opened
their doors in this relatively quiet stadium construction era were also
located on the edges of cities on available, cheap land, including Sicks'
Stadium in Seattle and Mile High Stadium in Denver.
The central point to be made is that prior to 1950, the most pressing
concern for team owners (and municipalities) trying to build a new stadium was cheap land. Proximity to the fan base and transportation accessibility were also important factors, but not as important as land costs.
Why was this the case? Because team owners were usually financing and
building the new stadium themselves, they had a very direct interest in
keeping costs down while still siting the facility in a location accessible to
27. See id. at 50.
28. See Steven Riess, Power Without Authority: Los Angeles' Elite and the Construction of
the Coliseum, 8 J. SpoRT. HIST. 50 (1981).
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their core market. As a result, the team owners sought urban edge locations, often near industrial areas, that kept land costs down, yet provided
access to their core fan base. In several cases, such as Wrigley Field,
Fenway Park, and Yankee Stadium, the city grew up around these facilities and within a handful of years the team owners had the best of both
worlds, an in-city stadium built for city-edge prices.
After World War II, several demographic and transportation trends
conspired to fuel a second stadium building boom. Suburbanization saw
families leave central cities for outlying areas, with a combination of pull
factors (cheaper land, larger homes) and push factors (inner city deterioration and racial tensions) reshaping the North American metropolitan
landscape in a startlingly short period of time. At the heart of these
changes was the relentless rise of the automobile. While America had
long begun traveling the road towards an auto-oriented culture, the provision of large freeways and interstates opened up cities and millions of
acres of land to new development. With the dismantling of many inner
city mass transit systems, the automobile came to dominate settlement
patterns. Retail and commercial uses followed families to the suburbs
and suburban areas were soon "malled" and "stripped," with the automobile serving as the principal means of transportation to almost all of
life's activities.
With the beginning of suburbanization in North American cities and
the growth of southern and western cities, sports leagues and sports
teams began to look to new markets for their product. Neilson writes,
"Club owners followed their customers out of declining immigrant cities,
into suburban landscapes of new affluence and mobility."'29 After the
war, teams moved with remarkable frequency, with a total of forty-three
moves since 1950.30 Ten baseball teams moved to new markets between
1950 and 1972. The NBA had numerous moves to new cities during the
post-war period, but Danielson notes that many of these moves were
during the very unstable early years of that league. In addition to relocating teams, expansion brought new teams to many cities, requiring new
or retrofitted facilities to host them. So, at the national level, leagues
were restructuring to take advantage of these emerging Sun Belt markets. But, how did all of these changes impact the location of sports facilities within metropolitan areas?

29. Brian James Neilson, Dialogue with the City: The Evolution of Baseball Parks, 29
LANDSCAPE 39, 45 (1986).
30. See DANUELSON, supra note 4, at 134.
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Not surprisingly, many of the facilities built in the 1950s and 1960s
took on characteristics of this trend towards suburbanization. Milwaukee
opened County Stadium in 1953 in the suburbs for the relocating baseball Braves of Boston. This stadium was surrounded by oceans of
asphalt, effectively removing the city from the game of baseball and insuring that automobiles were the only means of access to the stadium. To
attract the Dodgers from Brooklyn, the city of Los Angeles provided
land for a new ballpark at Chavez Ravine. Originally planned to be
home to public housing, this site was accessible solely by automobile,
with ample parking provided on site. In San Francisco Candlestick Park
opened in 1960 for the relocating Giants. Gershman notes that the city
had promised the team a 40,000 seat stadium, with 12,000 parking spaces
on site.31 Because this would require at least seventy-five acres and
would bring a suburban project to dense central city San Francisco,
downtown interests rejected locating the park downtown. 32 Consequently, the stadium was located at Candlestick Point, well south of the
downtown and accessible only by automobile. For the NFL's Vikings, the
Minneapolis suburb of Bloomington opened Metropolitan Stadium in
1956. Bloomington was one of the first suburban areas to attempt to
garner a 'big-league image' through the construction of a suburban
sports facility. Anaheim Stadium, which opened in 1966, was sited at the
intersection of not two, but five interstates to maximize automobile access to the facility.33 These projects epitomize the spatial migration of
sports facilities to suburban areas in the 1950s and 1960s. Numerous
other projects were built in suburban locations or at the distant edges of
cities in the 1960s, including Arlington Stadium (Dallas/Fort Worth),
Shea Stadium (New York), the Oakland-Alameda Stadium/Arena complex, Tampa Stadium, The Great Western Forum (Los Angeles), the
Metropolitan Center (Minneapolis), and the Houston Astrodome.
To be fair, a few projects in the 1960s attempted to recreate the urban
stadia of the pre-suburban era. In St. Louis, Busch Stadium, which
opened in 1966, was sited downtown in part to help spur the revitalization of the central city, with moderate success.34 RFK Stadium in Washington D.C. and The Spectrum in Philadelphia were sited in long
neglected portions of the city, with the hopes that these facilities might
aid in reviving the central city. In 1970, both Cincinnati and Pittsburgh
31.
32.
33.
34.

See GERsHmAN, supra note 21, at 180-182.
See id.
See Neilson, supra note 29, at 45.
See John Rooney, Sports from a GeographicPerspective in SPORT AND SoCIAL ORDER: CONTRIBUnONs To Tim SoCiOLOGY OF SPORT (Donald Ball & John Loy, eds., 1975).
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opened new 'concrete doughnut' multi-sports stadia in downtown areas
representing efforts to retain the core's centrality as a place for recreation and entertainment. Despite these attempts at locating sports facilities in the central city, though, a trend toward suburban facilities had
been firmly established during the 1950s and 1960s.
The 1970s witnessed the spread of sports facilities into increasingly
suburban and exurban locations. Kansas City located their new ballpark
and football stadium at an interstate interchange, at great distance from
the central city, with sprawling parking lots surrounding the facilities. As
the NFL gained an increasing foothold on America's sports consciousness, new stadia sprouted up in suburban Dallas, Boston, Buffalo, and
New York. In Detroit, suburban Pontiac built a huge new domed stadium for the NFL's Lions and Auburn Hills built an arena for the NBA's
Pistons. Other NBA teams to migrate to distant suburban locations were
Cleveland's Cavaliers and Baltimore's Bullets (now the Washington Wizards). Again, although examples of new downtown sports facilities of the
1970s can be found, such as Seattle's Kingdome and the Superdome in
New Orleans, the general trend was towards the continued suburbanization of sports facilities. This spatial trend clearly mirrored demographic,
business, and retail trends of the decade as people, jobs, and dollars continued to pour out of North America's central cities.
Despite the continued flight of middle class families and employment
to the suburbs, the suburbanization of sports facilities slowed considerably in the 1980s. In fact, since 1980 the vast majority of new professional
sports facilities have located in central city areas, with many projects
sited specifically to address downtown development goals. Some suburban facilities were built, Joe Robbie Stadium in Miami is the most obvious example, but a move towards downtown facilities clearly had been
established. Downtown domed stadia in Minneapolis, Indianapolis, Atlanta and St. Louis were built. New arenas in Miami, Charlotte, Orlando,
Phoenix, Washington D.C., Cleveland, Tampa, Portland, Vancouver,
Montreal, and Boston have all been located in central city areas. At the
minor league level this trend has also taken root, with new ballparks and
arenas locating in downtowns across America's smaller cities as well.
By far the hottest recent trend in sports facilities in the 1990s is the
downtown "ballpark." While this renewed interest in central city
ballparks might be more correctly be attributed to Pioneer Field in Buffalo, a downtown minor league ballpark, the facility that established
downtowns as viable and possibly essential to the success of a new sports
facility was Oriole Park at Camden Yards in Baltimore, which opened in
1992. Oriole Park at Camden Yards has had by far the greatest impact
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upon sports facilities of any stadium or arena built within the past halfcentury. Located just west of the downtown tourism and entertainment
district, which is centered on a Rouse built festival marketplace, Camden
Yards was successfully integrated into the urban fabric of central city
Baltimore. The massive commercial and critical success of Camden
Yards has established downtown sites as the preferred location for baseball stadia, as almost all projects that have been planned and built since
then have emphasized downtown locations, pedestrian connections, and
synergy with existing entertainment and tourism anchors. Camden Yards
is a "ballpark," one that is intimately tied to its host city and one that
established the Orioles as Baltimore's team, and more specifically, the
city of Baltimore's team. Despite some project shortcomings, such as a
substantial price tag, a large site footprint compared to ballparks of the
1910s, and surface parking lots springing up in a neighboring industrial
area, Camden Yards went a long way towards re-establishing the link
between downtowns and sports again.3 5 The sports facility was once
again part of the urban fabric, an element of the city rather than separate
from it.
Similar ballpark projects with urban locations have been built in or
are planned for the cities of Cleveland, Seattle, San Francisco, Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, San Diego, Atlanta, and Montreal. These facilities
have all explicitly used Camden Yards as both their architectural and
locational model. Even suburban facilities have attempted to attach
themselves to this trend. New ballparks in suburban Dallas-Fort Worth
(in Arlington next to the old Arlington Stadium) and suburban Milwaukee (next to County Stadium) have pedestrian paths and signature architectural elements that bring to mind Camden Yards. In addition, several
new arenas for NBA and NHL teams have tried to emulate Camden
Yards' urban setting, entertainment environment, and pedestrian
connections.
What is interesting about the emergence of central city locations as
the preferred site for sports facilities is how these locations differ so
greatly from past trends. Over the first three-quarters of the century,
sports facilities were sited with attention to three primary factors; 1)
available, cheap land, 2) accessibility, usually through rail and pedestrian
connections, and 3) proximity to the core fan group. As population and
employment suburbanized, sports facilities followed. Between 1950 and
35. See Edward Gunts, Grand Stand, ARcmTrcrURE, June 1992, at 64; Timothy Chapin,
Urban Revitalization Tools: Assessing the Impacts of Sports Stadia at the Microarea Level
(1999) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Florida State University) (on file with author).
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1980 when most facilities were built in suburban settings, the above three
factors still exhibited the most telling influence in the location of stadia
and arenas. Large swaths of available, cheap land were required to help
keep costs down and to house the thousands of automobiles that brought
fans to games. Accessibility was still a key, but it now rested primarily
with automobiles. Locations along interstates and other major highways
represented an important factor for determining the site of a new facility, even for urban facilities. Finally, by following their markets to the
suburbs, the migration of sports franchises and sports facilities to suburban and Sun Belt areas mirrored more general trends in population, retail, and employment.
The recent trend of locating sports facilities in urban settings flies in
the face of these three siting factors. First, rather than locating facilities
on large, cheap pieces of land, sports facilities are now sited on cramped,
urban sites that are very expensive to acquire and time consuming to
accumulate. Part of the skyrocketing costs of sports facilities can be attributed to expensive urban locations that require substantial investments in land prior to any work on the facility itself. Second, despite
locations near major downtown expressways, these sites are often more
accessible by mass transit than by automobiles, despite the increasing
use of automobiles and the decline in the use of mass transit in the
United States. Urban highways that bring fans to the central city to attend games are growing increasingly congested, further hindering the
transportation accessibility of the urban sports facility. Lastly, central
city locations are increasingly inaccessible to what had emerged to be the
primary fan base for sports teams, middle and (increasingly) upper middle class fans. By locating their home venues in the central city, teams
have distanced themselves from what had come to be their core fan base.
Within the past fifteen to twenty years, then, the location of sports
stadia and arenas appears to have become increasingly distanced from
the factors that have traditionally guided the siting of these facilities for
much of the century. At first glance, land costs, accessibility, and proximity to the core fan base appear to have been supplanted by a new set of
siting criteria, ones that dictate central city locations. The Camden Yards
model, in which a new facility is located on very expensive land, with fair
interstate connections but excellent transit connections, and located in a
central city that continues to bleed out middle class families each year,
has come to be the dominant location for these facilities. What can account for this metropolitan shift in facility location in the past twenty
years?
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IV.

E XPLANATIONS FOR THE RETURN OF FACILITMES TO

CENTRAL CITY SITES
In analyzing the locational shifts of sports facilities and the changing
influence of the various siting factors over the course of the century, it is
readily apparent that no single explanation can account for these
changes. Instead, a host of factors have combined to produce this shift.
These factors include the growing importance of the public sector in the
site selection process, the linkage of sports facilities to economic devel-

opment initiatives, and the changing economics of major league sports.
At first blush, the most obvious explanation for the return of sports

facilities to central cities appears to be the growing influence of the public sector in the facility siting process. For almost all new stadium and

arena projects a long, involved, official siting process is usually required
before construction can begin on the facility. This usually involves public
hearings, a public debate over the pros and cons of different sites in the
local media, and publicly-commissioned studies that compare the different sites. What gives the public sector such an active role in the site selection process? First, large projects like sports facilities require
environmental review because of the major impacts they will have on a
given portion of the metropolitan area. To be sure, the growing number
of environmental regulations guarantee the public sector a role in the
siting of a facility this size, regardless of who pays for it. However, this
has not been a major part in the rising influence of political factors in the
siting process, nor in the return of sports facilities to central city areas. In
many cases, environmental review is actually more likely to indicate suburban sites that offer better automobile access and fewer on-site environmental problems.
The second reason the public has gained an active role in the siting
process is the influx of public dollars into stadia and arena projects. By
bankrolling many of these projects, the public sector has guaranteed itself a major role in this siting process. The public sector has invested
billions in sports facilities over the years, something on the order of $15
billion dollars during the twentieth century,3 6 wvith an estimated $6-$7
billion for the most recent building boom (1985-2005). 37 In return for

these investments the public sector has effectively purchased the right to
a major say in the location and even sometimes the design of these
facilities.
36. See Raymond Keating, Sports Pork The Costly Relationship Between Major League
Sports and Government, 1999 BROOKINGS INsTrrunON PoL'Y ANALYSIS 339.
37. See Chapin, supra note 35, at 31-32.
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As noted in the earlier review of sports facility location over the
course of the century, the public sector has not always played a significant role in the siting of sports facilities. In the first half of the century,
team owners were primarily responsible for construction costs, land acquisition costs, and even some infrastructure upgrades for new sports
facilities. Consequently, cheap land was sought and city-edge or industrial area sites were the primary locations for new facilities. In more recent decades, the public sector is more often than not a major financier
of these projects. Even in cases where the public sector is not helping to
cover construction costs they are often on the hook for major infrastructure upgrades and other concurrent investments in the district surrounding a new facility. Not surprisingly, with more money invested directly
and/or indirectly in these projects, the public sector has demanded and
received a greater role in the site selection process. As the costs of new
sports facilities have skyrocketed, sports franchises have been more than
happy to trade facility construction dollars for other facility characteristics, including location. This 'location for dollars' tradeoff benefits the
teams in that they do not have to bankroll the entire project themselves,
as they did in the first half of the century. In return for their investment,
the public sector has received a role in the siting process and been more
able to link these facilities to local economic development initiatives.
The influx of public dollars into sports facility projects provides only
a partial explanation of the return of sports facilities to central cities over
the past twenty years. Since the 1950s, almost all stadia and a majority of
arenas have been financed primarily with public dollars. In fact, from the
1950s to the 1980s, sports facilities were financed by the public sector
even more so than in recent years, as the public sector now has begun
demanding some investment from the teams in these facilities rather
than publicly financing the entire project. Yet, despite the growing influence of public dollars throughout the 1950s and 1960s, new facilities continued to locate in suburban areas, well away from central cities. Many
suburban jurisdictions wanted to establish a local image as a "majorleague place" and they viewed a major professional sports team as a
means to that end. Consequently, Bloomington, Arlington, Pontiac, and
several other jurisdictions used a locally financed facility to attract a
team to the suburbs. So, in effect, suburban boosterism helped to lure
teams away from older central city facilities.
However, siting requirements that had dominated the first half of the
century, technical criteria (site size, accessibility) and economic criteria
(low land costs, proximity to the core market), remained a major force in
choosing sites for new facilities, even ones financed primarily by public

2000]

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SPORTS FACILITY LOCATION 377

dollars. It is important to recognize that sports franchises voluntarily
relocated to these suburban sites. The move of teams to Sun Belt areas
and suburban areas came because the franchises recognized that their
core market had migrated to these areas. In addition, the rise of the automobile convinced teams to identify and choose sites that maximized
automobile accessibility. So, while the influx of public dollars helped to
drastically reduce the team's expenses for a new facility, it did not contradict the factors that had long dictated the location of sports facilities
in the metropolitan area.
A second possible explanation for the massive return of sports facilities to the central city has been the linkage of sports facilities and downtown development goals. In order to justify the massive outlays of scarce
public dollars for sports projects in the 1950s and 1960s, project backers
have maintained that stadia and arenas are local economic development
engines. Project proponents have long argued that the employment impacts, tax revenues, and spin-off benefits of these projects more than
compensate the public sector for their up-front investments in sports facilities. As noted in the opening section of this article, a great deal of
research has gone a long way towards debunking this myth. As this profacility argument has been undermined, facility advocates have begun to
link these projects to a slightly different set of economic development
goals. Rather than arguing that sports stadia and arenas lead to broadbased economic development, proponents have increasingly targeted
these projects to microarea, or district-level development. These
projects, proponents argue, can help physically revitalize central city
cores and re-establish the centrality of the center city as a place of recreation, tourism, and business.38 While the entire metropolitan area may
not be much better off, revitalization of a long-dilapidated district will
lead to new construction, new jobs, an improved image, and a better
ability to compete for tourist and entertainment dollars at the regional
and national level.
This widely popular downtown or district development strategy has
been a major factor in the return of sports facilities to the central city.
Local political leaders, civic elites, and downtown land holders (elements
of the 'growth machine') have successfully pushed this redevelopment
agenda and been successful in relocating many teams to central city locations. Baltimore's Camden Yards is the best known example of this. This
approach represents the continuation of the long-established "bricks and
38. See Mark Rosentraub, Stadiums and Urban Space, in
supra note 2, at 178.
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mortar" strategy of economic development in North America's central
cities. It also represents the rise in influence of political factors in the
siting of sports facilities. Stadia and arenas are now located on cramped,
expensive central city land, often with poor automobile access and perceived limited nearby parking options. Technical criteria and economic
criteria still play a role, but in the past twenty years political factors have
come to dominate many siting processes and the local growth machine
often receives their downtown stadium or arena, but usually at tremendous public expense.
Again, though, the linkage of sports facilities to downtown development initiatives does not fully explain why central city locations have
come to be the dominant site for new facilities. Why did the downtown
trend not take hold earlier? The public sector has long been bankrolling
these projects and downtown 'bricks and mortar' projects have been a
major part of urban policy since the 1950s. Downtown interests have
long been a major force in metropolitan development. A few cities in the
1960s and 1970s, such as St. Louis, Seattle, and Pittsburgh, built downtown stadia despite the prevailing suburban trend, but these were the
exception rather than the rule. Only over the past twenty years have
downtown interests appeared to dominate the battle over the location of
sports facilities within the metropolitan area. If dollars and political influence were the sole ingredients necessary for the return of facilities to
the central city, then downtown sites would have dominated from the
1950s on. Yet, not until the 1980s did downtown facilities become the
rule rather than the exception.
The final piece to the puzzle lies in the economics of professionals
sports. In the earlier discussion of the shift of sports facilities to the suburbs, it was argued that one of the factors fueling this shift was the migration of the core fan base to these same suburban areas. Like many
other businesses during this period, sports franchises were following
their market to the suburbs, insuring proximity to their fan base. Within
the past twenty years, a second market shift has occurred, one that has
helped to fuel the return of stadia and arenas to central cities. Major
professional sports have come to identify a new core fan base, one with
even deeper pockets than upper middle class families; corporations. Corporations are the primary purchasers of luxury suites (often called corporate boxes), which can run anywhere from $50,000 to $500,000 a year.
Corporations purchase these boxes to entertain business clients and to
reward employees for a job well done. A typical roster list of luxury box
owners includes local financial institutions, local law firms, major regional vendors (like beer companies), and local businesses that have
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been pushed to purchase a luxury box because it will help keep the team
in the city. Luxury boxes bring in tens of millions of dollars to a team
each year, revenue that does not have to be shared with other teams. 9
Because of the size of these revenues and because they do not have to be
shared with the league or other teams, luxury boxes have been one of
the primary factors behind the most recent stadium building boom.
What does this new revenue stream have to do with facility location?
While large numbers of season ticket sales and club seating sales remain
an integral part of a team's bottom line, it is luxury suites that really
drive the financial success of a team. No longer are long-time blue-collar
fans (as in the old days) or the more recently identified suburban, middle
class fans the driving factor behind whether or not a team makes a profit.
Instead, it is corporate clients that shell out hundreds of thousands of
dollars a year that drive a team's financial success. Whereas the older fan
base was located in suburban areas, this new core clientele is to be found
in the central city, oftentimes in office towers that were a part of previous "bricks and mortar" strategies of downtown redevelopment. The
central point to be made is that, with the identification of corporations as
the new "core fan base," sports franchises have been more than willing
to accept the location of new facilities in central city areas. Indeed, teams
have begun to actively push for the construction of sports facilities in
central city areas. These locations provide a much better locational fit for
this new market, providing easy access for these fans.
Perhaps the best evidence of the importance of central city sites is
provided by recently constructed privately financed sports facilities. In
San Francisco, a new ballpark is being financed and built by the team not
far south of the central business district, offering a much better location
than the city-edge site previously occupied by the team. The MCI Center
in Washington D.C. was sited in that city's old retail district, with excellent Metro connections and easy access to the law firms, banks, and
other corporations that purchase luxury suites at the arena. Similar central city locations are seen for recently opened arenas in Portland, Vancouver, Boston, and Toronto. Even when new sports facilities are
financed primarily by the teams, they have been more likely to choose
central city locations that offer access to corporate markets. In those few
cases where suburban stadia or arenas were constructed, like Jack Kent
Cooke Stadium in suburban Washington D.C. and the National Car
Rental Center in suburban Miami, these locations were chosen due to a
39. In the "big four" major professional sports leagues, teams usually split general ticket
revenues, but not luxury box revenues.
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lack of central city sites (as in D.C.) or a tremendous public financing
package (as in Miami).
To be accurate, other factors have contributed to the return of sports
facilities to central cities. The widespread perception of Camden Yards'
success has fueled "downtown redevelopment through sports" efforts in
many cities. In North America, political leaders have traditionally tried
to model the success of projects in other cities; witness the previous
building booms of festival marketplaces, convention centers, and aquariums after successful projects in Boston and Baltimore. Camden Yards
has provided an attractive model that political leaders and the local media can utilize to generate support for new downtown sports facilities.
There also seems to be something of a shift in consumer attitudes away
from sterile and dull suburban shopping and living options towards more
interesting and vibrant, yet still safe in-city options. Many North American cities are seeing a trickle of middle and upper-middle class households back to the city, although many cities are still experiencing net
losses. The improving image of center cities has probably contributed
some to the expansion of entertainment and tourism facilities in the central city.
The central argument of this article is that while public dollars and
downtown redevelopment efforts have played an essential role in the return of sports facilities to central cities, the most important factor in this
locational shift was when teams became active seekers and consumers of
central city locations. Central city sites began to emerge as the dominant
locational trend only when sports franchises determined it was in their
financial interest to come back to the center city. While downtown sites
may be politically more acceptable and more money may be available
for (and necessary for) these sites, the acceptance and concurrent exploitation of these sites by the sports industry is what made the Camden
Yards model the dominant model over the course of this recent building
boom.
V.

THm PoLiTIcAL ECONOMY OF SPORTS FACILITY LOCATION

The location of a professional sports facility within a metropolitan
area is invariably tied to three sets of decision-guiding factors: technical

factors like site characteristics, economic factors like land costs, and
political factors like economic development initiatives. Over the first half
of the century, technical and economic factors dominated the siting process. With teams financing their own facilities, team owners sought
cheap, accessible locations in an attempt to minimize their costs. However, with the infusion of public dollars and the linkage of publicly-
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backed economic development goals to these facilities, political factors
grew in influence after 1950. Between 1950 and 1980, suburban jurisdictions successfully lured many teams to locations far from the central city.
These locations provided a nice fit to the rearranging landscapes of metropolitan areas and the economics of professional sports, as teams followed their migrating fan base to the suburbs.
Within the past twenty years, however, sports facilities have shown a
particularly intense affinity for urban locations. When professional
sports began to exploit the corporate market, central city locations became financially attractive to teams and the preferred location for new
facilities. Expensive, complex central city sites have become the dominant location of new sports facilities, what I have termed the Camden
Yards model. Most cities currently planning a new facility have identified
these urban locations as the desired location of a new facility. These locations have been lauded as a return to the "good old days" when sports
and center cities were inextricably tied together, epitomized by Wrigley
Field, Fenway Park, Madison Square Garden, and other historic facilities
that would not be so beloved in different settings. However, it is important to recognize that most of these facilities were sited in city-edge or
industrial areas, not due to their distinct urban character, but because
these locations provided cheap, accessible land. In subsequent years the
city filled in around them, creating the urban settings so highly valued
today.
In many ways, the urban ballparks, stadia, and arenas of today actually represent a new locational model of the professional sports facility.
This model is one that imposes itself upon the urban environment, sometimes successfully, as with ballparks in Cleveland, Baltimore, and Denver, and sometimes unsuccessfully, as in Chicago (New Comiskey Park)
and Miami (the original Miami Arena). These new central city stadia and
arenas are sited in largely built-out, very dense urban landscapes wvith a
mix of land uses and historic structures and a location that requires careful planning and "contextualization" to make these sites work.40 Despite
all that is written about the great ballparks and arenas of the "golden age
of the baseball park,"'" most of those classic old facilities were not sited
in environments nearly as complex as those of the modern central city
sports facility.
The political economy surrounding sports facility location continues
to grow increasingly complex as the new century dawns. This article has
40. See Chapin, supra note 35, at 467-470.
41. See Bluthardt, supra note 25.
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argued that the combination of public dollars, economic development
goals, and the economics of professional team sports currently represent
the major factors in sports facility location. There is no doubt that additional factors, including local development agendas, the power of the local growth machine, national development and retail trends, have all
made contributions to the siting process as well. The ongoing collision of
private sector profit-focused objectives and public sector economic development-centered goals requires the consideration of an increasingly
broad set of criteria in siting sports facilities in the metropolitan area.
Of perhaps most importance to cities currently engaged in or soonto-be engaged in a sports facility siting process is the recognition that
only when the sports industry became convinced that central city locations were profitable and desirable did these locations become popular.
Despite massive investments into sports facilities by the public sector
and a long-established central city redevelopment agenda, North American cities were able to attract teams back to central city facilities en
masse only when the industry deemed it in their best economic interest
to return. The political economy of sports facilities and sports facility
location continues to tilt towards the private sector. Even in the siting of
sports facilities paid for largely by public funds, the sports industry itself
remains "the straw that stirs the drink."

